Combating the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria: Political and Military Approach

Amos Ojo Adedeji
Doctoral Student, Peace and Development Studies, Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria

Abstract

In the history of the human race, power has more often been wielded through terror and inciting fear. The use of terror began at the very birth of organized society as a means of discretion or punishment. Terrorism has become a song to be sung in Nigeria with the emergence of dreaded Boko Haram terrorising old and young, male and female, rich and poor, spearing nobody in the area of their operation, most especially in Northern Nigeria; hence collateral killing is their watchword. The study examines the efficacy of the political and military approach in combatting the menace. It employs a mixed approach, which mostly relies on both primary and secondary data collection to elicit information. To meet the security challenges posed by this dreaded sect, the researcher advocates the use of intelligence-led policing, counter-insurgency and trust-building strategies between the government and citizenry.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Guerilla, Intelligence, Insurgency, Political, Military and Terrorism.

Introduction

Nigeria, which is a key strategically for the U.S has come under attack by a radical Islamic sect known as Boko Haram (Western education is forbidden). It is officially called itself "Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'irati wal jihad" which is literally interpreted as "people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and jihad" or "Ahl-as-sunnh wa al-jama'a ala minhaj as-salaf", which means "people of the way of the prophet Muhanmed, in line with the earliest generation of Muslims [1].

There is evidence of the set of different factions within the movement who disagree about tactics and strategic direction; in some cases, they compete against each other for attention and followers. One faction of the group may be focused on the domestic issue while another on violent international extremism [2]. Another noticeable piece of evidence indicated that the group are of three different factions, one remains moderate and welcomes an end to the violence, another wants a peace agreement, and a third refuses to negotiate but implements strict sharia law across Nigeria [3]. Since 2009, the group has attacked politicians, religious leaders (both Christian and Muslim), private and public buildings and individuals whom they deem to be engaged in unislamic activities. The group emerged from an attempt to stop the spread of western religion, governance, development, natural science, psychology, media studies, and law, to mention but a few, which the group claimed were disrespect to their God (Allah) and then should not be permissible [4]. Boko Haram has also carried out several mass casualties attacks, and it has been on record to be the first militant group in Nigeria to embrace the use of suicide bombings [5].

Statement of the Problem

Combating terrorists has become a household discussion after the popular attacked

of the world trade centre by Osama Bin Laden led Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001, popularly called 9/11. In a conference on "Roots of Evil" with the theme "Fighting Terrorism for Humanity, the then Sectary General of United Nations Kofi Annan stressed that there is a need to address the root causes of terrorism in order to be able to fight it. There is a need to understand this deadly phenomenon and carefully examine what works and what does not work in fighting it. The outbreak of the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria marked yet another phase in the recurring pattern of violent uprisings, riots, and disturbance in Nigeria. Given the heterogeneous nature of Nigeria society, the religious sensitivity of Nigeria and the wave of terrorist's insurgents all over the world, the situation could not have been different.

Boko Haram terrorism has continued to pose a clear thread to the Nigerian economic, social, and political section. There in a need for joint efforts of our leaders and the people to rise to the challenges Boko Haram posed to the country. Nigeria, with the help of allies, need to engage in the strategy of deterrence by preventing Boko Haram form attacking the nation. The war of terrorist will be worn by engage in both defensive and offensive means and as well exploit all avenues to put an end to their operation in Nigeria.

Aims and Objectives of the Study

The primary aim of this study is to explore the workable strategies to combat Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, while the objectives will be to

1. investigate the possible causes of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.
2. identify the possible approaches to combat Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Statement of the Hypothesis

H_o: Intelligence-led policing and deterrence are not the best strategies to combat the menace of Boko Haram.

H_i: Intelligence-led policing and deterrence are not the best strategies to combat the menace of Boko Haram.

Methodology

The research design employed to carry out the study is survey method, which will simply be descriptive in nature. Primary and secondary data sources were chosen to for data collection. Chibok local government of Borno state, Nigeria was chosen as the population of the study. Two hundred people living in the selected community were randomly selected among the whole population and subsequently administered the questionnaires. Inferential Statistics version of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), which is chi-square, was chosen to analyze the data collected through questionnaires. The responses from questionnaires were presented in a table using absolute figures and comparative percentages capable of self-explanation and further analysis. The earlier stated hypothesis was therefore tested towards proving or disproving it.

Literature Review

Conceptualise Terrorism

Terrorism has become merely another derogatory word rather than a description of a specific type of activity. Terminology is a matter of agreement for the purpose of common understanding. The word terror from terrorism means great fear, a condition in which one fears for one's life. The person or group who carries out an aggressive act or creates a condition of great fear is seen as a terrorist. Thus, the term terrorist refers to a group of individuals involved in creating a state of great fear, which give rise to the essence of terrorism [6].

United States Vice president in 1986 task force defined terrorism as the unlawful use of threat or violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives [7]. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals, or groups to modify their behaviour or policies" The office for the

protection of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany defined "terrorism as enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which is intended to be achieved by means of assault on the life and property of other persons, especially by means severe crimes as detailed in art [8].

Terrorism is the systematic use of terror or unpredictable violence against governments, the public or individuals to attain political objectives [9]. One of the definitions of terrorism by the United States army in the 1980s is that terrorism is unlawful violence, or any other unlawful, harmful act committed (or threatened) against civilians by a group or persons for political or other ideological goals [10]. There are five common elements in the above definitions: the use of violence or aggression, terror or threat, assaults, the intention of sowing fear in a target population and political objectives or goals.

However, the above definitions did not provide the ground to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violent conflicts, such as guerrilla or even conventional war. Clearly, both conventional and guerrilla warfare constitutes the use of violence for political ends. Systematic large-scale bombing of civilian populations in modern wars was explicitly intended to spread fear among the targeted populations.

Despite the ambiguities and disagreements discussed above, the concept of terrorism in modern usage is most commonly associated with certain kinds of violent actions carried out by individuals and groups rather than by states and with events that take place in peacetime rather than as part of a conventional war. However, the original usage of the term in a political context referred to state violence and repression as the "Reign of Terror" [11].

Terrorism in Nigeria

The phenomenon of terrorism is not recent in Nigeria; it has been in existence since the entity called Nigeria exists separately on a tribal level.

The king then employed terrorist acts to capture villages for emancipation purposes, the village annexed became the King's subject, thereby paying taxes and homage to the King (reference). Guerilla warfare has also been using for annexation purposes. The recruiting of followers for religion purposes also witnesses forms of terrorism in the 18th century. Islamist Jihadists employ terrorist activities to capture the Northern part of Nigeria, which is dominated by Muslims [12].

Nigeria terrorism is defined as terrorism who seeds were sown in Nigeria and which germinated and is now flourishing in Nigeria [13]. Focusing on the working definition of terrorism as an act of inciting fear or causing terror to get the attention of the target, one may conclude and agree with Madumagu as he mentioned five possible terrorist groups in Nigerian that stand out: the Niger Delta Militant; the Boko Haram Insurgency; the Middle Belt (Jos killings); kidnapping for ransom and Armed Robbery. To this group, he added what he called "low intensity" ones like Oodua People's Congress (OPC) and The Movement for the Advancement of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOP) [14].

Faleti claimed that the activities of some groups such as the Ijaw dominated Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); The Odua People's Congress; The Tiv Militia, The Movement for the Advancement of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); and the Agbekoya are interpreted as ethnic insurgencies which are also terrorist groups in Nigeria [15]. The terrorist group in Nigeria has a long history, dating back to the decade preceding Nigeria's independence or immediately after independence [16]. However, Nigeria's terrorism has been modified or transformed by development in Nigeria, but their roots and trajectories are clear.

Kidnapping has several forms; to some, ransom is their objective, while for others, their objective is political, blackmail, intimidation, and pressure on the opponents. There are also

corporate and highly organized armed robbery as well as fraudulence and individual. There are other forms of terrorist in Nigeria, those with popular democratic protests and strikes which may turn violent or terrorist and which the so-called hoodlums often hijack. Nigeria students have been known to kidnap armed security agents in uniform and cease their weapons. Unemployed youth have also infiltrated democratic protests to terrorize the public. Part of the struggle to actualize the mandate of the acclaimed winner of the June 12, 1993, presidential election (Abiola) in Nigeria involved several acts that can be classified as terrorist. The only publicized act was the hijack of an Abuja-bound airplane to Niamey, Niger Republic in October 1993 [17].

Activities of Boko Haram in Northern Part of Nigeria

The ongoing crisis of Boko Haram in some part of Northern Nigeria, especially the Northwest and North-East states, federal capital territory inclusive, has been a source of concern to many. This has made the nation to be wrecked by periodic violence. The insurgency of Boko Haram has put the country into a state of dilemma, and people are becoming more anxious about this current existential situation in our dear country (Nigeria) and what the future can possibly hold for them.

The outbreak of Boko Haram in Nigeria in July 2009 marked yet another phase in the recurring pattern that violent uprisings, riots and disturbances have become in Nigeria. The Boko Haram uprising was not the first forceful attempt to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian society, but like the first major attempt and subsequent small-scale attempts, it widened the scope of the efforts at Islamic revivalism [18]. The then governor of Borno state, Ali Modu Sherif, started Boko Haram as a small terrorist group known as "ECOMOG" for political reasons. The government did not take cognizance of the group, possibly because of their small and weak in nature.

The small group later metamorphosis into Boko haram, which began to appear in 2002 and quickly acquired the moniker of "Nigeria Taliban" with initial leadership under Mohammed Yusuf [19] and with a stated goal of a Sharia state in Nigeria [20]. Boko Haram, who is a contemporary terrorist group, has a compelling ideology that play a central role in religion. Religion can be a powerful motivator for all kinds of human action. As Douglas and Michael noted, "religion deals with spiritual or ultimate human concerns such as life or death, our highest value and selves, the root of evils, the existence of God. Religious assumptions shape our minds from childhood, and for these reasons, religious systems and institutions have had and continue to have extraordinary power to affect the course of human history [21].

Boko Haram's ideology portrays the world in terms of an epic struggle between good and evil, and they are convinced in their own revealed truth from God and that they are true followers of Mohammed, hence they are guaranteed salvation and victory. It is necessary to establish that Boko Haram did not give room for other person or group's points of view because they believe their cause is just, even crime committed by them is justified as they believe God (Allah) is on their side [22]. This superiority intent may likely be the major reason while the group want to impose the Sharia Penal code on Nigeria's secular society.

In their belief, the superiority of Allah's rule provides them with a feeling of justification for violating man-made rules with violent atrocities. Doing the bidding of a higher power demands sacrifice but also means fewer limits on violence. It's easier to kill if you think you're doing God's will; violence is seen as necessary in order to save oneself, one's family or even the world, which is one of their objectives [23]. They claimed that Nigeria is their land and that it was European colonial powers that demarcated it arbitrarily, thereby embracing Christians to govern the state. They portray the situation in terms of a Muslim

population oppressed by non-Muslim rulers, infidels and apostates backed by sinister forces that intend to keep the local Muslim Communities subservient. Its followers are reportedly influenced by the Koranic phrase "anyone who is not governed by what has revealed is among the transgressors" [24].

In essence, Boko Haram as a group came to be called by locals and eventually by the government because of its anti-Western focus sought to create a 'better' Nigeria through strict adherence to Islam. Given of this appellation to the sect is a securitization process; an attempt by the government to make people see them as evil to hate and to kill. Over time, the group's members saw themselves increasingly at odds with the secular authorities, whom they came to view as representatives of a corrupt, illegitimate, Christian-dominated federal government. Their disappointment in local government leaders was worsened in the summer of 2009 when authorities in Bauchi refused to allow them to preach and recruit publicly [25].

Boko Haram's attacks have also spread geographically, at the initial stage, the attack is limited to a handful of states in the northeast of Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, Plateau, and Kaduna and mostly in and around the towns of Maiduguri, Damaturu, the attacks had spread to the west and south of their original areas of operation, to include the towns of Kano, Katsina, Jos, Gombe, and the nation's capital, Abuja. However, it is also equally likely that Boko Haram's increasing operational capabilities may have been derived from interactions with weapons traffickers and other criminal networks already indigenous to the northern regions of Nigeria. There is an indication that expansion in Boko Haram's tactics, lethality, and geographic reach have a link with al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates. Al Qaeda was quoted saying to Boko Haram:

"We are ready to train your children to use weapons and will supply them with all we can, including support and men, weapons,

ammunition and equipment, in order to defend our people in Nigeria and respond against the aggression of the Christian minority," [26].

Szrom and Harnisch identified the following common traits in all al Qaeda haven: "underdevelopment, incompetent governance, and a citizenry disenfranchised by or disillusioned with the central government, an environment conducive to al Qaeda's presence and operations must also have a history of radical Islamism that al Qaeda operatives can exploit [27]. Nigeria fits squarely into Szrom and Harnisch's pattern of Al Qaeda operating environments, excepting the history of radical Islam, although there is a profound level of conservative Islam and a history of Shariah law. In Nigeria, Islam is generally conservative in nature, but it is small groups within the larger community that are Salafi. In these regards, Nigeria qualifies as a "Distressed Zone" which is defined as an area where "a terrorist group is threatened by government-sponsored military action, often supported by regional or Western powers. Groups in such an environment may retain some safe territory and leadership, and limited training, fundraising, and operational capabilities" [28]. This is an area that is conducive to al Qaeda but not necessarily ideal.

Boko Haram's initial stated goal of the abolition of secular apostate governments and a return of Shariah fits into the al Qaeda strategy. Al Qaeda has succinctly stated its goals for Africa to include the removal of apostate regimes in Muslim nations, targeting Nigeria's petroleum infrastructure to damage the international system, and striking governments that are allied with the West [29]. Given that those goals dovetail with Boko Haram's stated goals, and with Boko Haram having since adopted an international outlook [30], potential synergy is present.

Strictly speaking, up until 2009, the group's tactics were generally more guerrilla in nature, striking en masse on police, security, and government facilities before dissipating. After the death of their leader Mohamed Yusuf, they

spent a brief period of time reconstituting. It is around 2011, that the tactics shifted to terrorism, favouring civilian targets [31]. Excepting al Shabaab and AQIM, Boko Haram is the only group in Africa to utilize suicide attacks and release martyrdom videos [32]. While Mohamed Yusuf had a preference for massed guerrilla attacks, his successor, Abu Muhammad Abu Bakr bin Muhammad (Shekau), had a preference for cellular terrorist raids [33]. Shekau was reported captured and killed by Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) [34].

Factors Responsible for Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

In order to understand the emergence of Boko Haram, one must look for reasons why its ideology has found resonance among a capable group of young men in Nigeria. Some of the identified factors are enumerated below:

One of the major factors that lead to the uprising of Boko Haram is an attempt to impose an Islamic Religious Ideology (Sharia) on a secular independent Nigeria. According to Isichei, this attempt is not the first of its kind, and it is a precedent laid by the same Islamic religious sect called Maritatsine [35]. This is against the law of the land. Part II section 10 of the 1999 constitution states expressly that "the government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as a state religion" [36].

Rampant corruption among political and wealthy elite that is heavily invested in the status quo. Corruption is so rampant that the wealthy and the connected are perceived as able to get away with virtually any kind of injustices. As John Campbell notes, Boko Haram's ideology "draws on a long-standing local tradition of radical Islamic reform that emphasis the pursuit of justice for the poor. There are specific political and socio-economic frustrations found predominantly in northern Nigeria. Poverty, unemployment, and lack of education are much higher than in the rest of the country. Socio-economic grievances include

the huge gap between the aspirations of Nigeria's youth and the opportunities provided by the system for achieving a better life. A swelling population amid economic despair creates an environment in which radical extremist ideologies can thrive, and the new elites are seen by many as protecting and benefiting from a system of corruption and injustice. Boko Haram is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos [37].

As Boko Haram's founding leader Yusuf preached, "Our land was an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to a kafir land. The current system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs." [38]. Throughout the Muslim communities of northern Nigeria, there is a sense of unease and insecurity about the spiritual and moral future of their children and concern about the fading influence of religious leaders like the Sultan of Sokoto. [39]. In 1903, Sokoto caliphate was rapidly replaced by a Western European, Christian power with very different ideas about the relationship between governance and religion.

Furthermore, the wrong interpretation of the scripture by those who claim authority to the interpretation of holy books, as it is a serious disease for an ignorant to claim authority to knowledge. Many of the so-called Boko Haram leaders use their shallow knowledge to interpret the scripture to suit their selfish end, banking on the ignorance of their followers. Adebayo identified some factors responsible for using religion as an instrument of polarization amongst leadership tussle, sectarian jingoism as well as excessive patriotism to one's religious sect, which consequently transformed to fanaticism [40].

The issue of schooling is particularly salient to understanding the ideology of Boko Haram. The Hausa word 'boko' is derived from the English word which means the ability to read and write, especially in the Western-styled educational system, as distinct from the Islamic educational system that existed in northern

Nigeria before being colonialism [41]. As Isa observes, the term implies a sense of rejection and "resistance to the imposition of Western education and its system of colonial social organization, which replaced and degraded the earlier Islamic order of the jihadist state" [42]. Further, Islamic scholars and clerics who once held sway in the caliphate state and courts assigned the name boko to northern elites who spoke, acted, ruled, and operated the state like their Western colonial masters. Consequently, poverty and collapsed governance was blamed on the failures and corrupt attitudes of modern elites who have acquired a Western education and are currently in positions of power. As such, western system represented is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is, therefore un-Islamic, which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness [43].

There is ethnic and political colouration in the Boko Haram insurgency, as observed by [44]. Ethno-political competition for control of the state has been brought mostly due to ethnic groups' pursuit of superiority. The Boko Haram crises had ethnic connotations, and this is largely due to the multiethnic nature of the country. The emergence of Boko Haram in northern part of Nigeria is a clear indication that northerners who lose power to the southerners are behind the insurgency. After the end of Obasanjo tenure and the subsequent short stay of Late President Umaru Musa Yaradua in power due to death. Average northerners prevented Jonathan from assuming the presidency after the death of Yaradua, but to no avail. Even his election into office in 2011 witnessed the same pressure from the northerners. It can be assumed that Boko Haram is northerners' weapon or instrument of war against the southerners' presidency, which they assumed to be their turn. Unfortunately, the monster has grown beyond ethnic cleavage and the sect is getting tougher even as reputable northerners head the nation.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons can also be assumed to aid the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Proliferation has been a trouble to most national, regional, and international organization. "Nearly 40% of trade in small arms is carried out through illicit mean" [45]. Nigeria as at present, has no organized system of arms control. However, the difficulty is not much on curbing illicit arms trade but in restricting its availability on the black market.

The arms given to the sect to defend politician for their selfish interest has now been used against the state. The group also alleged buying weapons from security outfit which are made easy as a result of security privatisation, government armory or local manufacturer with a low price. They also get weapons from most of the military stations attacked, some from demobilized soldiers and so on. Availability and excess of small arms and light weapons have helped Boko Haram to carry out their evil acts against the nation.

One other major factor in the recurrence of the Boko Haram attack in Nigeria is the government's inability or perhaps reluctance to deal decisively with past occurrences and the dramatis personae, including their backers, implicitly. It would appear that once a culprit or a sect member avoids being killed during the suppression of their insurrection, it is all but sure that he will participate in the next one, all other things being equal. This non-deterrence has arguably encouraged a culture of impunity and promotes a circle of violence.

Albert (2005) considers the international conspiracy as part of the factor. He observed that some external forces used the loosely security measure of the country to foment violence [46]. Many of those arrested in connection to the Boko Haram issue were traced to other Muslim countries. The late dictator of Lybia, Mamur Ghadafi was also fingered as one of the possible sponsor of the deadly act. There is also link with jihadist movement outside Nigeria. The modus operandi of the sect, fashioned after the Taliban in Afghanistan, has generated some suspect. It

was also speculated of having a link with the Salafist Group for preaching and combat (GSPC) in Algeria.

Findings through Data Analysis

The broad objective of the paper is to examine the efficacy of the political and military approach in combating the terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. This section, therefore, presents the analysis and interpretation of the data collected through questionnaires. Two hundred (200) copies of the questionnaires were distributed to the selected respondents. The table below shows administered questionnaires.

Table 1 revealed that 90% of the questionnaires were filled and returned while 10% were not returned. Thus, the percentage will be based on the one hundred and ninety (90%) questionnaires returned.

Table 1. Questionnaires Distributed

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Returned	180	90
Un-Returned	20	10
Total	**200**	**100**

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Demographic Profile of the Respondents

The main assignment in this section is to present the demographic profile of the respondents of the work using five demographic characteristics of Sex, Age, Marital Status, Educational Attainment and Employment Status.

According to Table 2, 64.4% of the respondents were male, while 35.6% were female. On the age group, 22.2% are between age brackets 18-30, 28.9% are under 31-45, 32.2% fall within age brackets 46-60, while 16.7% fall under age 61 and above. The breakdown of marital status shows that 50% were married, 11.1% were single, 22.2% were divorcees and 16.7% were either widow or widowers. Similarly, as depicted above, 22.2% of the respondents had secondary education, 55.6% had tertiary education, while the remaining 22.2% had post-graduate education. In addition, on employment status, 25% of the respondents were students, 38.9% were Civil Servants, 22.2% were in business-related occupation, and 13.9% were the applicant.

Table 2. Demographic Information of Respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percentage
Male	116	64.4
Female	64	35.6
Total	**180**	**100**
Age Group		
18-30	40	22.2
31-45	52	28.9
46-60	58	32.2
60 and above	30	16.7
Total	**180**	**100**
Marital Status		
Married	90	50
Single	20	11.1
Divorced	40	22.2
Widow/Widower	30	16.7
Total	**180**	**100**

Academic Qualification		
Secondary Education	40	22.2
Tertiary Education	100	55.6
Post Graduate Education	40	22.2
Total	**180**	**100**
Employment Status		
Student	45	25
Civil Servant	70	38.9
Business	40	22.2
Applicant	25	13.9
Total	**180**	**100**

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Presentation of Data according to Variables

This section presents the major core of the study. it investigates the efficacy of the political and military approach in combating the terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The scale will be used to analyse Table 3 and 4.

Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

This subsection highlights the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Four (4) relevant statements were posed to respondents, and the responses are presented in the following Tables.

Table 3. Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

S.No	Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria	SA	A	U (%)	SD	D
1	Emergence of Boko Haram was as a result of failure of institution of government in Nigeria	16.7	22.2	22.2	22.2	16.7
2	Politics of ethnicity cannot be separated from Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria	22.2	30.6	8.3	17.8	21.1
3	Nigeria porous border aids the smuggling of sophisticated weapons used by Boko Haram into the country	34.4	38.9	4.4	13.9	8.3
4	There is an international dimension to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria	43.3	26.7	6.7	12.2	11.1

Source: Researcher Field Survey, 2022

As shown in Table 3, 16.7% and 22.2% strongly agreed and agreed, respectively, that emergence of Boko Haram was as a result of the failure of the institution of government in Nigeria, 22.2% and 16.7% strongly disagreed and disagreed, respectively to the assertion while the remaining 22.2% was undecided. The table also indicates that 52.8% of the respondents affirmed that politics of ethnicity could not be separated from the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria; 8.3% were neutral, while 38.9% did not support the assertion. As depicted above, 34.4% of the respondents strongly agreed that Nigeria's porous border aids the smuggling of sophisticated weapons used by Boko Haram into the country, 38.9% agreed, 13.9% strongly disagreed, 8.3% disagreed while 4.4% were undecided. In addition, 43.3% and 26.7% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed respectively that there is an international dimension to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, 12.2% and 11.1% strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively while 6.7% were of no opinion to the above claim.

Approaches to Combat Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

In subsection, the focus was to examine the approaches to combat the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The analysis of the results is presented below.

Table 4. Approaches to Combat Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

SN	Approaches to Combat Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria	SA	A	U (%)	SD	D
5	Military option can unilaterally curb the insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria	22.2	17.2	5	33.3	22.2
6	Combination of both Military and Political approaches will eradicate the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria	55.5	27.8	2.8	7.8	6.1
7	Intelligence led policing with deterrence is the best strategy to combat the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria	27.8	38.9	5.6	11.1	16.7
8	Nigeria needs the help of external powers to combat Boko Haram insurgency	25	55.6	2.8	5.6	11.1

Source: Researcher Field Survey, 2022

According to Table 4, 39.4% of the respondents were in line with the opinion that military option to Boko Haram insurgency can unilaterally curb the insurgent, 55.5% were not in line with the opinion, while 5% did not decided. Also, 55.6% and 27.8% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed respectively to the statement that a combination of both military and political approaches will eradicate the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, 7.8% and 6.1% strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively to the claim while 2.8% were of no opinion. Similarly, 66.7% of the respondents take side with the statement that intelligence-led policing and deterrence is the best strategy to combat the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, 27.6% oppose the statement and the remaining 5.6% were did neither support nor disagree. In addition, 25% of the respondents strongly agreed, 55.6% agreed that Nigeria need the help of external powers to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, 5.6% strongly disagreed, 11.1% disagreed, and 2.8% were undecided.

Testing of the Hypothesis

The hypothesis stated earlier is tested in this section using the chi-square (X^2) method. The statistical method to be used for testing the hypothesis is chi-square,

$$where: X^2 = \frac{\sum (O - E)^2}{E}$$

Where:
X^2 – Chi-Square
$\sum$ = Summation
O = Observed frequency
E = Expected frequency

In proofing the hypothesis, H_o represents the null hypothesis while H_i will stand for the alternative hypothesis.

Hypothesis Based on Statement 7

H_o: Intelligence-led policing and deterrence are not the best strategies to combat the menace of Boko Haram.

H_i: Intelligence-led policing and deterrence are not the best strategies to combat the menace of Boko Haram.

Table 5. Analysis of Respondents on Research Hypothesis

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	50	27.8
Agree	70	38.9
Undecided	10	5.6
Strongly Disagree	20	11.1
Disagree	30	16.7
Total	180	100

$$\text{Expected frequency} = \frac{\text{No of Observed Frequency}}{\text{No of Variable}}$$

$$180/5 = 36$$

Table 6. Analysis of chi-square (X2)

Variables	O	E	O-E	$(O-E)^2$	$(O-E)^2/E$
Strongly Agree	50	36	14	196	5.44
Agree	70	36	34	1156	32.11
Undecided	10	36	-26	676	18.77
Strongly Disagree	20	36	-16	256	7.11
Disagree	30	36	-6	36	1
Total	180				64.43

Formula for degree of freedom = r – 1
= 5 – 1 = 4

Decision Rule

If the calculated X^2 is less than the critical (i.e., value of X^2 from the table), the alternative hypothesis is accepted while the null hypothesis is rejected.

Decision

Since the calculated value (64.43) is greater than the Table value (9.448), we reject the null hypothesis (H_o) and accept the alternative hypothesis (H_i), which states that Intelligence-led policing and deterrence are the best strategies to combat the menace of Boko Haram.

Results of the Finding

Strategies to Combat Terrorism (Boko Haram) in Nigeria

The foregoing decision has clearly revealed the challenges of terrorism and the security in the country. It is equally obvious that terrorism in the country, especially since the return to civil rule in 1999, has constituted a serious threat to peace and national security. The findings revealed some policies and strategies to combat the menace. The strategies are grouped into two parts, namely political and military approaches as no single approach can unilaterally curb the insurgency. The combination of the duos will complement each other.

Political Approaches to Combat Boko Haram Insurgency

In his analysis of extremist groups in Nigeria, Chris Nwodo noted that it was Boko Haram opposition to the social injustice that lead them to insurgency [47]. Government must address the myriad socio-economic demands like poverty, health, unemployment, infrastructure and so forth. The link between many kinds of grievances and the rise of violent extremists is particularly prominent in the north, where the people have a higher level of poverty, unemployment, health problems and

overall insecurity than elsewhere in Nigeria. The government should be pluralistic, representative, and just in their treatment of the Nigerian citizens.

Economic Isolation

Successfully isolating Boko Haram from funding can severely undermine their operations. Economic isolation requires both physical and informational interruption of financial, business, and criminal enterprises. Attempting to economically isolate Boko Haram from the population must be narrowly focused on the insurgents and minimize the effect on the population, by offering viable replacement sources of employment and revenue. Applying economic isolation on Boko Haram must be planned and implemented in coordination with civilian agency specialize in the local economy and culture and individuals representing significant knowledge of the local business and financial sectors.

Thanks to the immediate past government for revamping the educational policy of the country in such a way that the traditional Al-Manjiri education was integrated into the mainstream of education. Experience has shown that the products of the schools have largely been involved in many of the ethno-religious crises in the northern part of the country because they have been grossly neglected and not recognised. Those who pursue the program take to begging, roaming aimlessly the streets, and indulging in petty crimes and other deviant behaviours. To find a permanent solution to the social scourge of the Al-Manjiri, it is pertinent that the federal government takes a drastic step by giving due attention to this age-long system of education by given their product due recognition just as it does to the western system of education.

There should be a significant reform in the legal sector, the appeal among many Muslims of Sharia law is that secular laws are seen as serving only the elites of Nigeria. Corruption is so rampant that the wealthy and the connected are perceived as a sacred cow who is able to get away with virtually any kind of injustice. As Campbell notes, Boko Haram's ideology "draw on a long-standing local tradition of radical Islamic reform that emphasis the pursuit of justice for the poor through the imposition of Sharia [48].

The government of Nigeria should employ a counter-ideology strategy by the emphasis that positive changes for Muslim communities in the North can come without the need for violence, but violence can undermine it. Those who find resonance in the group's ideology must be convinced that they are not the vanguard of a movement toward positive change but murderers of positive change and what the founding father of Sokoto Caliphate, Usman Dan Fodio stood for.

Military Approach to Combat Boko Haram Insurgency

Nigeria should develop her counter-terrorism capabilities by providing non-lethal equipment and training and helping security forces to be more precise in their use of force. This could happen by welcoming experts in counter-terrorism discipline from countries like US, UK, and Spain who have once witnessed terrorism; they also need to be trained by these countries in special skills to combat terrorism apart from the direct involvement of the experts. The monitoring and surveillance capabilities of Nigeria should be improved. In fact, the monitoring and surveillance units of other countries may be particularly useful here.

Quality intelligence in support of counterterrorism effort is needed; this can only be possible by training security officer in the science and skills of intelligence. Effort of the Institute of Security, Nigeria in collaboration with the Human Resource Development Centre, University of Lagos is commendable by running a specialist course on Intelligence and Security Investigation. Military leaders in collaboration with Nigeria Government should embrace this effort and promote it as this will

help the fight against terrorism. Gathering intelligence in Nigeria is deficient as observed by former Inspector General of Police Alhaji Ibrahim Coomassie in July 2011 [49]. Police and military should try as much as possible to rebuild the already damaged relationship between them and the civilian populace.

Another means to combat the Boko Haram insurgency is what is called penetration. Penetration is a clandestine activity involving the use of a trained agent to infiltrate target establishments and installations for the purpose of obtaining information. A trained agent can be sent to the midst of Boko Haram pretending to be a sympathizer to their ideology whereby leaking their secret to the government, will help the security men to be at alert and work against their evil intention.

Electronic Devices will also be added advantage in monitoring and identification of any terrorists most especially Boko Haram. Mounting of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) device in all the strategic locations in the Northern part and extend it to the Southern part of Nigeria as well. This derives has done wonder in the Western world, and it is believed that if Nigeria can adopt the device, the wave of criminality will be reduced to a minimum level [50]. Videotape, miracode and computer sketch are other modern technology in aiding checking of the menace of Boko Haram if adopted. This device with satellite wave was used by Americans during the killing of Osama Bin Laden. That is the beauty of technology, and we must join the league of technological advance nations if the war on terrorism would be won.

Government should establish ground forces within the security unit like America did. The purpose of this is to win all wars of terrorism. The rate at which Boko Haram is going, if not checked, will find a sympathizer in the South, incase this happens, the ground forces will be used to counter them. Counter in surgency requires soldiers and marines to be ready to fight and to build depending on the situation and a variety of other factors [51].

Airpower tactics should also be developed in Nigeria: Airpower can contribute significant support to land forces conducting counter in surgency operations. Aircrafts can strike the insurgents; it can respond quickly with precision fires to conventional assembly of insurgents. Apart from the split fire on the terrorist group, it will aid transport systems during the action by transporting troops, equipment, and supplies, and move the land forces to where they are needed in a short possible time. It will also perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions [52].

Community policing will be another vital means of combating Boko Haram activities. This comprises of enforcement, preventive and community service work aimed toward crime prevention. The emphasis is to encourage police and residents to work together. It enables residents to learn critical skills in detecting and reporting crime. Since Boko Haram is not angels or spirits, they live within one community or the other. Working together of Police and Community will help in the notice any suspect or even strange person and guide against any attempt for crime to be committed. Community policing is a modern approach to bring the police and residents together and ensuring security and safety.

There is a need to employ the use of forensic science to investigate terrorist crime; this field of study interacts with the legal system. According to Ogundipe, "forensic science in security operations functions for both offensive and defensive intelligence in areas such as detection of espionage, economic sabotage, terrorist, arsonist and robbery activities" [53]. If Nigeria can develop the field of forensic science in our universities and research institutes by financing them, it will be useful and aid the investigation process of the suspected Boko Haram in detection that is linked with one crime or the other.

Controlling the Flow of Firearms

Efforts at mopping up all illegally acquired small arms in the country will help in combating the insurgency and other related crises in the nation. The federal government could also encourage a situation whereby the arms are given close monitoring and vigilance by the Customs and the Police. This could be achieved through professionalizing the security agencies. Regular raid of known gunrunners, locally weapons producers and criminal hideouts is also key. The use of this mop-up strategy will go a long way in weakening this terrorist group.

National Joint Task Force (JTF), which is a federal unit, did excellent and commendable work in Niger Delta. JTF comprises of Army, Police and Customs officers, they should also be dispatched to the Northern part of Nigeria to secure the area and act as counter terrorism agents. They should be well trained, be objective in discharging their duty and protect the civilians and as well deter Boko Haram operations. The dedication of this group will pose a great threat to the camp of Boko Haram.

Unity of Command

Unity of command is the preferred doctrinal method for achieving unity of effort by military forces. Where possible, JTF leaders achieve unity of command by establishing and maintaining formal command or support relationships. Unity of command should extend to all military forces supporting the task of eliminating Boko Haram. The ultimate objective of this arrangement is for the forces to establish effective control while attaining a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within the society. Command and control of all the forces (JTF) engaged in the mission should be exercised by a single leader through a formal command and control system.

Conclusion

As a relatively young democracy with a very large and diverse population, Nigeria should anticipate the emergence of politically violent groups from time to time. All countries, even advanced Western democracies, have to deal with such challenges. The study has shown that the Nigerian governments (past and present) have failed to tackle this problem through articulated and well-organized policy actions. There is no doubt that a nation that focuses on developmental projects without addressing the issue of security is only planting corn on the rock. There is need for courage and determination contributions toward that shared goal. The end of Boko Haram, like all terrorist groups, will be a matter of time. It will require the joint efforts of both the leaders and the people of Nigeria to eradicate Boko Haram insurgency from Nigeria.

Recommendations

Based on the findings in this study, the following recommendations are put forward:

1. Government should try to seek for the assistance of experienced foreign countries. The battle against Boko Haram is not a battle that can be fought alone and win without the assistance of experienced nations.

2. Federal government and NSA should find out exactly the demands of Boko Haram, and if these are achievable demands, the government should work on it.

3. There is a need to advocate for religious tolerance and the call to forget the differences of the religious affiliation of Nigerians, the need for a better understanding of the differences for the purpose of building a unified nation. Through proper education and knowledge of the plight of each religious group, the amicable settlement of the differences could be facilitated.

4. The government at all levels should jointly move from conflict resolution to the stage of conflict prevention through the provision of adequate and effective security in each

state for prompt respond to insurgence of Boko Haram crisis anywhere at any time.

5. Security apparatus should be provided with adequate and modern security facilities and training that will enhance their quick response to any attack or intending attack.

6. Federal Government needs to enforce moral codes on the citizens of the nation by bringing to book moral violators and those who foment trouble or crisis in any society.

7. Civil society organizations, religion and traditional leaders can provide those essential services which the government has been unable to take care of, such as security; run a range of religious and social programmes that have the effects on preventing men, women, and children from turning to radical factions of Islam; take the lead of debating the need for peace, offer a means for local individuals to pursue justice and providing alternative to violent.

8. Above all, the government should reduce poverty among Nigerians, especially northern part, where poverty is so endemic so that the reservoir of recruits for Boko Haram crises will be punctured.

Conflict of Interest

This work was done with an open mind and objectivity of judgment without any interest to influence my view, but to give the reader reality of things. All arguments raised were of the author and not of the publisher. The author, therefore, takes responsibility of the view raised in the paper.

Acknowledgement

References

[1] Forest, J.J.F. (2012). Confronting Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The JSOU Press, Mac DILL, Air Force Base, Florida.

[2] Meehan, P and Speier, J (2011). Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, and Intelligence. November.

[3] Gambrell, J (2011). "Nigeria: Radical Muslim Sect Grows More Dangerous," Associated Press.

[4] Ori, K.O. (2013). Conceptualizing Boko Haram: Victimage Ritual and the Construction of Islamic Fundamentalism. Master Thesis, Department of Communication Studies, Faculty of the University Graduate School, Indiana University.

[5] Forest, J.J.F. (2012). Confronting Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. *The JSOU Press*, Mac DILL, Air Force Base, Florida.

[6] Wałek, T. (2018). Concept, Origin and Classification of Terrorist Phenomena. University of Physical Education, Kraków, Poland ORCID: No 2. http://www.ejournals.eu/Securitologia/Securitologia

[7] Schmid, A.P and Jongman, A. J (1988). Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. Amsterdam: *North-Holland Publishing Company.*

[8] Schmid, A.P and Jongman, A. J (1988). Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. Amsterdam*: North-Holland Publishing Company.*

[9] Ogaba, D.O (2007). The Phenomenon of Terrorism. FOG Ventures, Surulere, Lagos.

[10] Madunagu, E (2011). "Reflections on Nigerian Terrorism" in the Constitution: *A Journal of Constitutional Development,* Vol. 11, December Edition, CENCOD & Panif Press, Lagos.

[11] Chaliand, G. and Blin, A. (2016). "The Invention of Modern Terror" In Gerard Chaliand (Ed.) History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to ISIS. *University of California Press.*

[12] Thurston, A. (2016). 'The Disease is Unbelief', Boko Haram and Political Worldview. The Brookings Project on US Relations with Islamic World. Analysis Paper. No. 22, Centre for Middle East Policy, Brookings.

[13] Madunagu, E (2011). "Reflections on Nigerian Terrorism" in the Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development, Vol. 11, December Edition, *CENCOD & Panif Press*, Lagos.

[14] Madunagu, E (2011). "Reflections on Nigerian Terrorism" in the Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development, Vol. 11, December Edition, *CENCOD & Panif Press*, Lagos.

[15] Faleti, S.A (2010). Ethnic Conflict and Resolution. National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN), Lagos.

[16] Madunagu, E (2011). "Reflections on Nigerian Terrorism" in the Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development, Vol. 11, December Edition, *CENCOD & Panif Press*, Lagos.

[17] Chinwokwu, E. C. (2012). History and Dynamics of Terrorism in Nigeria: Socio-Political Dimension. *International Journal of Innovative Research and Development*. Vol 1 Issue 11.

[18] Adesoji, A. (2010). The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria. Online (www.africa- spectrum.org).

[19] Hill, J (2010). Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute).

[20] Johnson, T (2011). "Boko Haram," Council on Foreign Relations (November 7), citing the original source, which is: http://www.examiner.com/conservative-inyakima/never-before-has-nigeria-experienced-suchviolence -by-muslims-pt-ii.

[21] Douglas, J. D. and Michael J. T. (2017). Religion and the Individual: Belief, Practice, and Identity. MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

[22] Stern, J (2004). Terror in the Name of God (New York: Harper Collins, 2003. EccoTrade Paperback Edition).

[23] Forest, J.J.F. (2012). Confronting Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. *The JSOU Press*, Mac DILL, Air Force Base, Florida.

[24] Chothia, F (2011). "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram?" BBC News (August 26, 2011), online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501.

[25] Onuoha, F.C. (2010). "The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram CrisisExplained," *African Security Review* 19(2).

[26] Le Sage, A. (2011). "The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb." *Strategic Forum.* No. 268, July.

[27] Szrom, C and Harnisch, C (2012). "Al Qaeda's Operating Environments." *American Enterprise Institute*. March. Web. 02 Jan 2012.

[28] Szrom, C and Harnisch, C (2012). "Al Qaeda's Operating Environments." *American Enterprise Institute*. March. Web. 02 Jan 2012.

[29] Le Sage, A. (2011). "The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb." *Strategic Forum.* No. 268, July.

[30] Campbell, J (2011). "To Battle Nigeria's Boko Haram, Put Down Your Guns: How to Undermine the Growing Islamist Threat, Foreign Affairs (September 9). Online at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68249/john-campbell/to-battlenigerias-boko-haram-put-down-your-guns.

[31] Forest, J.J.F. (2012). Confronting Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. *The JSOU Press*, Mac DILL, Air Force Base, Florida.

[32] Cook, D (2011). "The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria." CTC Sentinel Vol 4, Iss 9 (Sept).

[33] Le Sage, A. (2011). "The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb." Strategic Forum. No. 268, July.

[34] African Union (2021). Preliminary Report NIGERIA: ISWAP Claims Abubakar Shekau Was Killed on Direct Orders Of ISIS, 8th June. ACSRT/PRE-REP/06/2021.

[35] Isichei, E.l. (1987). The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria, 1980-1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited, in: *Journal of Religion in Africa*, xvii, 3, 194-208.

[36] Federal Military Government (1999). Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation Decree), no. 24 of 1999 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.

[37] Johnson, T (2011). "Boko Haram," Council on Foreign Relations (November 7,), citing the original source, which is: http://www.examiner.com/conservative-inyakima/never-before-has-nigeria-experienced-suchviolence-by-muslims-pt-ii.

[38] Thurston, A. (2016). 'The Disease is Unbelief', Boko Haram and Political Worldview. The

Brookings Project on US Relations with Islamic World. Analysis Paper. No. 22, Centre for Middle East Policy, Brookings.

[39] Forest, J.J.F. (2012). Confronting Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. *The JSOU Press*, Mac DILL, Air Force Base, Florida.

[40] Adebayo, R.I. (2003). Religion and National Unity: The Gap between Theory and Practice. *Ado Journal of Religions*.2 (2).

[41] Isa, M. K (2010). "Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria," In Okumu, W and Ikelegbe, A (Ed.) Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies).

[42] Isa, M. K (2010). "Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria," In Okumu, W and Ikelegbe, A (Ed.) Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies).

[43] Isa, M. K (2010). "Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria," In Okumu, W and Ikelegbe, A (Ed.) Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies).

[44] Sanusi, A. (2009). Religious-Based Violence and National Security in Nigeria: Case Studies of Kaduna State and the Taliban Activities in Borno State. Unpublished Thesis for the Master of Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

[45] Olaniyi, R.O (2011). Arms Control and Demilitarization, National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN), Lagos, Nigeria.

[46] Albert, I.O. (2005). International Dimensions of Social Conflicts in Nigeria Since the 1980s. A Lead Paper Presented at NDA National Conference on Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria since 1980. (15th-17th June).

[47] IRIN News (2011). United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Analysis: What Will FollowBoko Haram?" IRIN News (November 24).

[48] Campbell, J (2011). "To Battle Nigeria's Boko Haram, Put Down Your Guns: How to Undermine the Growing Islamist Threat, Foreign Affairs (September 9). Online at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68249/john-campbell/to-battlenigerias-boko-haram-put-down-your-guns.

[49] Soniyi, T (2011). "Nigiera: Boko Haram – Why Security Agencies Have Failed, "This Day (July 20), online at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201107201234.html.

Adetona, S.O and Salawu, R.I (2006). Electronic Security System. Institute of Security, Nigeria. *Concept Publications*, Lagos.

[50] United States of America (2006). Counterinsurgency. Marine Corps, *War Fighting Publication*, Washington, D.C, USA.

[51] United States of America (2006). Counterinsurgency. Marine Corps, *War Fighting Publication*, Washington, D.C, USA.

[52] Ogundipe, O.T (2011). "Forensic Science and Criminal Investigation" in Ogundipe, T.O and Adebayo, A (Ed) the Science and Skills of Security Investigation. Institute of Security, Nigeria. *Concept Publications*, Lagos.